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Abstract 
Women are consistently underrepresented in certain careers—not just in mathematics and 
science but also in fields such as philosophy and music composition. In my dissertation, I focus 
on a recently discovered factor that may contribute to this imbalance: Women are culturally 
stereotyped as being less intellectually gifted than men, and as a result they may face a number 
of obstacles when pursuing degrees and professions that are portrayed as requiring intellectual 
giftedness (Leslie, Cimpian, Meyer, & Freeland, 2015). Prior research on this potential 
mechanism has focused exclusively on adults; thus, little is known about its developmental roots. 
The earlier children acquire the notion that brilliance is a male quality, the stronger its influence 
may be on their aspirations. Our present research shows that, by the age of 6, girls are less likely 
than boys to believe that members of their gender are “really, really smart” – a child-friendly 
way of referring to brilliance (Studies 1 and 2). Also at 6, girls begin to shy away from novel 
activities said to be for children who are “really, really smart” (Studies 3 and 4). Moreover, this 
stereotype undermines both adults’ and children’s evaluation of females’ capabilities for 
activities portrayed as requiring brilliance (Studies 5 and 6). These studies speak to the early 
acquisition of cultural ideas about brilliance and gender, and to the immediate impact that these 
stereotyped notions have on people’s interests and evaluations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Over the past few decades, there has been enormous interest in exploring the reasons 
underlying women’s consistent underrepresentation in science, technology, engineering, and 
math (“STEM” fields; Hill, Corbett, & St Rose, 2010) compared to their greater involvement in 
non-STEM disciplines, such as social sciences and humanities (e.g., Ceci & Williams, 2007; 
Halpern et al., 2007). However, a closer inspection of the data on women’s involvement in a 
variety of disciplines, both STEM and non-STEM, reveals a reality that is more complex than 
one might expect given the standard focus of the discussion. Although there are indeed fewer 
women in STEM fields than in non-STEM fields overall, it is also important to note that there is 
great variability in women’s representation within the two domains. For example, in a recent 
report by the National Science Foundation (NSF, 2013), about half of the PhD recipients in 
molecular biology and neuroscience were women, but women were awarded only about 20% of 
the PhDs in physics and computer science. Similar variation is present in the social sciences and 
humanities (SocSci/Hum). For example, although women were awarded more than 70% of PhDs 
in art history and psychology, statistics collected by the U.S. National Center for Educational 
Statistics showed that women make up only 21% of full-time philosophy faculty (Division 
APAP, 2011). To explain this more-complex pattern in gender distributions, Leslie, Cimpian, et 
al. (2015) recently proposed that women might be particularly likely to be underrepresented in 
fields where success is portrayed as depending on brilliance, which women are perceived as less 
likely to possess than men (Bennett, 1996, 1997; Kirkcaldy, Noack, Furnham, & Siefen, 2007; 
Tiedemann, 2000; Upson & Friedman, 2012). Here, I aim to examine this proposal from a 
developmental perspective, investigating in particular the emergence of the stereotype linking 
men more than women with intellectual talent. Revealing the development of children’s 
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gendered ideas about intelligence fills an important gap in the literature. Moreover, these 
findings could enable researchers and policymakers to devise efficient interventions to reduce the 
impact of these negative stereotypes on young girls’ career aspirations.  
Before describing this research, I will first review two broad perspectives on the current 
gender imbalances in career participation, particularly in STEM fields. I refer to them as the 
“biological” and “societal” perspectives. 
The Biological and the Societal Perspectives  
The biological perspective. The biological perspective makes two critical claims: (1) 
men and women are inherently different in terms of their cognitive and socioemotional makeup, 
and (2) these differences influence men’s and women’s aspirations, performance, and career 
choices, leading to the current gender disparities. Despite consensus on these main claims, 
researchers propose various hypotheses regarding which specific aspects men and women differ 
on. Here, I focus on three main hypotheses suggesting that men and women are inherently 
different with respect to their cognitive abilities (e.g., mathematical and spatial skills; e.g., 
Halpern et al., 2007; Hyde, Fennema & Lamon, 1990; Kell, Lubinski, Benbow & Steiger, 2013; 
Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2009), cognitive styles (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2002; Connellan, Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Ba’tki, & Ahluwalia, 2001), and preferred lifestyles (e.g., Ceci & 
Williams, 2011; Hayes & Bigler, 2013; Lubinski, Benbow, Shea, Eftekhari-Sanjani & 
Halvorson, 2001).  
To illustrate, the “cognitive ability” hypothesis suggests that men are naturally endowed 
with higher mathematical and spatial abilities than women, especially at the upper end of the 
distribution (e.g., Halpern et al., 2007; Hyde, Fennema & Lamon, 1990).  One piece of evidence 
supporting this gender difference was found in a meta-analysis involving 3 million subjects, 
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where Hyde et al. (1990) reported that males were better than females at solving mathematical-
reasoning problems in adolescence and adulthood. Moreover, this gender difference was even 
bigger in high-end samples consisting of talented people, which accords with the argument that 
men are more variable in a number of traits (e.g., mathematical reasoning abilities) compared to 
women (e.g., Halpern et al., 2007; Hyde et al., 1990). Since many fields are highly selective, the 
overrepresentation of males in the right tail of the distribution is regarded as a plausible 
explanation for the greater number of males than females in these areas.  
The “cognitive style” hypothesis argues that men and women naturally differ in at least 
two dimensions in their cognitive styles, which are “systemizing” and “empathizing” (Baron-
Cohen, 2002). In particular, the male brain is better at systemizing, in that men are predisposed 
to learn about objects and mechanical relationships, have a strong drive to analyze the rules 
underlying systems they observe in the world, as well as to predict the output of such systems. In 
contrast, the female brain is better at empathizing, in that women are predisposed to learn about 
people and their emotions, have a strong drive to understand people’s mental states and thoughts, 
and are able to respond intuitively to these emotions in an appropriate way. To examine this 
hypothesis, Connellan et al. (2002) tested whether newborns would display these preferences by 
showing them an expressive person and a similarly sized inanimate object. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, male newborns looked longer at the object, whereas female newborns looked longer 
at the person. Next, to examine how such gender differences relate to people’s tendency to enroll 
into different disciplines, Billington, Baron-Cohen, and Wheelwright (2007) reported that 
cognitive style strongly predicts people’s entry into a physical science or humanities subject: 
Specifically, students with stronger systemizing and weaker empathizing tendencies are more 
likely to pursue careers in physical science. These findings are used to argue that men and 
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women may be inherently suited for different types of careers (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Connellan et 
al., 2002). 
The “preferred lifestyle” hypothesis claims that men and women tend to prioritize 
different aspects of life, in that men often value career over family while women often value 
family over career. These different work-life priorities direct them to choose different careers, 
and perhaps that is why women opt out of many fields with heavy workloads, such as STEM 
(e.g., Ceci & Williams, 2011). As evidence, many more female graduate students than male 
graduate students expressed the opinion that having a flexible part-time job is important to them 
(Lubinski et al., 2001). These findings accord with a national survey collected in Britain (Hakim, 
2006) and a recent survey conducted in the United States (Hayes & Bigler, 2013), in which 
women prioritized family over career more than men did. Although researchers sometimes 
disagree about the exact source of these differential lifestyle preferences, one common view is 
that the differences exist because women and men are inherently, biologically different (e.g., 
Ceci, Williams, & Barnett, 2009; Hakim, 2006). Hakim (2006), for example, suggests that the 
gender differences in work-life orientations are driven by evolutionary forces rather than 
sociological factors, given the fact that these differences “persist long after the equal 
opportunities revolution of the 1960s and 1970s gave women equal rights to assess higher 
education and all positions…” (p. 280).  
Although the above-mentioned findings provide some evidence in favor of a biological 
perspective on women’s underrepresentation in STEM, there are also valid reasons to doubt the 
two main claims that anchor this perspective. To reiterate, the first claim is that women and men 
are inherently different on a number of dimensions (cognition, preferences, etc.) that are relevant 
to their career choices. However, many of these differences are unlikely to be innate, which 
	 5 
opens the door for alternative, sociocultural explanations.1 For example, Spelke (2005) provides 
compelling evidence that newborn boys and girls are similarly competent in terms of their 
reasoning about basic aspects of the world, such as objects and numbers. Additionally, in the 
comprehensive meta-analysis by Hyde et al. (1990), boys do not outperform girls on math tests 
until adolescence. Moreover, women’s representation in the STEM domains varies from culture 
to culture and even from region to region, suggesting that sociocultural factors play a role in the 
emergence of gender disparities. For example, Pope and Sydnor (2010) investigated the 
relationship between (1) gender gaps in math performance across various regions of the United 
States and (2) the extent to which Americans in that region displayed more sexist attitudes (e.g., 
agreed with the idea that women should take care of the home). As predicted by the sociocultural 
perspective, they found a positive relation between the two factors: the greater the sexism in a 
region, the larger the gender gaps between boys’ and girls’ math achievement in that region. 
Similarly, Guiso, Ferdinando, Sapienza, & Zingales (2008) reported that the more equally 
women are treated in a country, the smaller the gender gap in math performance, including at the 
right tail of the distribution. Thus, it is possible that the reported gender differences in 
mathematical and spatial abilities are a result of differential social input for boys and girls.  
The second claim of the biological perspective is that the differences between men and 
women lead to the current gender gaps in representation. However, recent findings shed doubt on 
this claim as well. For example, there is no relation between the extent to which a field requires 
systemizing over empathizing and the male-female PhD ratio in that field (Leslie, Cimpian et al., 
2015). Moreover, women are also underrepresented in some disciplines that arguably do not 
require a high level of mathematical or spatial abilities, such as philosophy and music 																																																								
1 I do not discuss here the literature on the effects of hormones on cognition. This literature is vast, but the results 
are at best mixed (for reviews, see Ceci et al., 2009; Halpern et al., 2007).  
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composition (e.g., NSF, 2013). On the basis of results such as these, it seems unlikely that 
differences in men’s and women’s natural aptitudes and inclinations can provide a satisfactory 
account of the variability in gender gaps across fields. 
The societal perspective. According to the societal perspective, people’s beliefs, 
performance, and career aspirations are shaped by a range of sociocultural factors, ultimately 
leading to gender imbalances in participation (e.g., Bennet, 1996, 1997; Diekman, Brown, 
Johnston & Clark, 2010; Guiso et al., 2008; Kirkcaldy, Noack, Furnham, & Siefen, 2007; 
Sugimoto, Lariviere, Gingras, & Cronin, 2013; Milkman, Akinola & Chugh, 2012, 2015; Moss-
Racusin et al., 2012; Pope & Sydnor 2010; Sheltzer & Smith, 2014; Tiedemann, 2000; Upson & 
Friedman, 2012; Wennerås & Wold, 1997). The social factors concerning women’s participation 
can be grouped into two different kinds of stereotypes. The first class of stereotypes concerns the 
overall culture of a field, and includes stereotyped beliefs about the characteristics of the field’s 
typical members, the typical work environment, and the field’s values (e.g., Cheryan, Master, & 
Melzoff, 2015). Women might be less likely to pursue fields whose culture is perceived to be 
inconsistent with the image that women are encouraged to adopt by the norms of current society. 
For example, people hold the impression that mathematicians and engineers are socially 
awkward, that their work is not people-oriented, and that they value “a spark of genius,” which is 
incongruent with how many women perceive themselves. Therefore, women may find those 
fields less appealing and may be less likely to pursue them as a result. For instance, after 
interacting with a stereotypical computer scientist (e.g., a person who wore glasses and a t-shirt 
that read “I code therefore I am,” and was a Star Wars fan), women were less interested in 
learning more about computer science and less confident that they’d be able to succeed in the 
field (Cheryan, Siy, Vichayapai, Drury & Kim, 2011). This reaction was mediated by their 
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feelings of dissimilarity to the representative of the field and by a lack of sense of belonging. 
Moreover, this negative effect persisted for up to two weeks after this brief initial exposure 
(Cheryan, Drury & Vichayapai, 2013). 
The second class of stereotypes relevant to gender gaps consists of negative beliefs 
against women’s abilities (e.g., Ambady, Shih, Kim, & Pittinsky, 2001; Leslie, Cimpian, et al., 
2015). These stereotypes are importantly different from the stereotypes about the culture of a 
field. Whereas the latter contain information about the prototypical member of a field, the former 
focus on females’ abilities, regardless of field. To illustrate, our culture holds a pervasive, 
negative stereotype against women’s mathematical abilities (e.g., Ambady et al., 2001; Boucher, 
Rydell & Murphy, 2015; Kirkcaldy, Noack, Furnham, & Siefen, 2007; Tiedemann, 2000). For 
example, men typically estimate their own analytical and practical intelligence to be higher than 
women do (Kirkcaldy et al., 2007), despite the fact that there are no mean-level differences 
between men and women on these dimensions (Aluja-Fabregat, Colom, Abad, & Juan-Espinosa, 
2000; Colom, García, Juan-Espinosa, & Abad, 2002; Saggino et al., 2014). This stereotype also 
extends into school contexts. Elementary school teachers perceived boys as more capable of 
logical thinking than girls, even when boys and girls performed equally well at math 
(Tiedemann, 2000). Additionally, this stereotype influences teachers’ attributions of students’ 
math performance: They believe it is the extra effort that girls spend on math problems that 
enables them to achieve a level of math performance comparable to boys’—without this extra 
effort, they believe that girls would fall behind (e.g., Robinson-Cimpian, Lubienski, Ganley, 
Copur-Gencturk, 2014). These differential perceptions are likely to influence children’s 
conceptions of their own mathematics abilities and may eventually steer girls away from 
participating in STEM fields (e.g., Jacobs, Davis-Kean, Bleeker, Eccles, & Malanchuk, 2005).  
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Although the existing evidence for the societal perspective helps explain women’s lower 
involvement in STEM fields, it overlooks the fact that there is great variability in women’s 
representation within STEM and within the non-STEM domains. This complicated distribution 
of gender gaps naturally gives rise to the question of whether women’s representation in a 
particular field might also be influenced by features that cut across the STEM vs. non-STEM 
divide. 
The Field-specific Ability Belief Model 
In a recent New York Times article titled “Google, Tell Me. Is my Son a Genius?” 
(Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014), the author tallied anonymous Google searches and found that 
parents were two and a half times as likely to search “Is my son gifted?” as “Is my daughter 
gifted?” More generally, parents tended to make more intelligence-related searches about their 
boys than about their girls. Although it seems like this might be an isolated example, much other 
research supports the idea that our culture holds a broad stereotype against women: that they are 
less intellectually gifted than men (e.g., Bennett, 1996, 1997; Kirkcaldy et al., 2007; Tiedemann, 
2000; Upson & Friedman, 2012). For example, people tend to underestimate women’s 
intelligence while overestimating men’s (e.g., Beloff, 1992; Furnham, Reeves, & Budhani, 2002; 
Rammstedt & Rammsayer, 2000), even though the actual intelligence of men and women is in 
fact not different (Aluja-Fabregat et al., 2000; Colom et al., 2002; Saggino et al., 2014). 
Moreover, research focusing on self-estimated intelligence indicates women themselves have 
lower perceptions of their intelligence than men do. For instance, women have been shown to 
estimate their IQs lower than men estimate theirs, regardless of their actual intelligence levels 
(Hamid & Lok, 1995).  
Given the fact that women are stereotyped as having less raw intellectual talent than men, 
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Leslie, Cimpian, and their colleagues (e.g., Leslie, Cimpian et al., 2015; Meyer, Cimpian & 
Leslie, 2015) recently proposed that the ability beliefs that prevail in each discipline or 
profession may influence women’s representation. To elaborate, some disciplines are more likely 
than others to endorse the idea that high-level success is a matter of raw intelligence rather than 
hard work and dedication. In philosophy, for example, there are widespread messages suggesting 
that success is largely determined by whether one possesses a spark of genius (e.g., Marshall, 
2013). Since women are perceived as being less likely to possess these innate talents, they may 
be more vulnerable to a field’s belief suggesting brilliance is the key to success. The stereotypes 
against their intellectual abilities may lead women in brilliance-focused fields to feel a lower 
sense of belonging, which may affect their motivation as well (e.g., Good, Rattan, & Dweck, 
2012). The “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype may also make women the targets of bias from 
current members of brilliance-focused fields, which may in turn create an inhospitable 
environment for them. As a result, women might become less likely to pursue these areas in the 
long term. To summarize, this account consists of two components: 1) the field-specific ability 
belief component, which emphasizes the variability that exists between fields in their beliefs 
about the necessity of innate talent for success, and 2) the widespread societal stereotype against 
women’s intelligence. I will refer to this hypothesis as the Field-specific Ability Belief (“FAB”) 
hypothesis.  
Leslie, Cimpian, and their colleagues (2015) found initial evidence of this hypothesis in a 
nationwide study of academics. In this study, they recruited 1820 faculty, post-doctoral fellows, 
and graduate students from different research universities across the United States. Participants 
were asked to report what they believe is necessary to achieve success in their own field. 
Consistent with the FAB account, the more a field emphasized brilliance, the lower women’s 
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representation was at the PhD level in this field. Moreover, ability beliefs predicted women’s 
representation above and beyond several alternative explanations, such as differences among 
fields in work-life balance or the extent to which they focus on people vs. objects (e.g., Ceci, 
Ginther, Kahn, & Williams, 2014; Diekman et al., 2010; Ferriman, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2009). 
Experimental studies provide converging evidence for this hypothesis (e.g., Bian, Cimpian, 
Leslie, & Murphy, under review; Emerson & Murphy, 2015; Good, Rattan, & Dweck, 2012; 
Smith, Lewis, Hawthorne, & Hodges, 2013). For example, in a series of experiments by Bian et 
al. (under review), college students and Mechanical Turk workers were provided with a range of 
hypothetical educational and professional opportunities (e.g., major, internship, job) that were 
portrayed as requiring either brilliance or dedication, depending on the condition. Some 
experiments also included baseline conditions in which no additional information was provided 
about these opportunities. Then, participants’ motivation to pursue these opportunities was 
measured. Women (but not men) reported lower motivation towards the activities said to be for 
people of high intellectual ability, indicating that the messages emphasizing the key role of 
innate talents in achieving success undermine women’s motivation and interest. 
These results illustrate the power of the FAB model to account for several features of 
women’s involvement across the spectrum of professions. First, the model provides new insights 
into women’s underrepresentation in STEM, where beliefs about brilliance were commonly 
endorsed. Second, the model suggests that field-by-field variability in ability beliefs may 
explain, at least in part, why women have made more inroads in some STEM fields (e.g., 
molecular biology) than others (e.g., physics; NSF, 2013). Third, the FAB model suggests an 
explanation for the variability in female representation within the social sciences and humanities. 
Although discussions of gender in academia often overlook these fields (but see Haslanger, 
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2008), the social sciences and humanities in fact exhibit at least as much variability in 
participation by women as STEM fields do (NSF, 2013). Again, this variability in representation 
closely tracks the inter-field variability in ability beliefs. In sum, the FAB model provides a 
potentially important lens through which to view the gender imbalances that are still so common 
in academia and the workplace.  
Despite the robust evidence for the FAB hypothesis, a key question remains unanswered: 
How might the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotypes interact with a field’s ability messages to 
discourage women’s participation? Discussing the mechanisms involved will also lay the 
foundation for the present developmental investigation of the FAB proposal. There are at least 
two plausible pathways: The stereotypes and ability beliefs might jointly (1) undermine women’s 
motivation to pursue fields that emphasize brilliance and (2) give rise to bias in evaluating 
women’s competence. I will present some evidence for each of these mechanisms and then 
describe how I investigated them in young children in the present studies.  
Potential Mechanisms  
First, the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype might affect women’s self-concept, leading 
them to doubt their ability to succeed in professions that are portrayed as requiring such 
brilliance (e.g., Bennett, 1996, 1997; Bian et al., under review; Gunderson, Ramirez, Levine, & 
Beilock, 2012). This lowered self-estimation may decrease their sense of belonging and increase 
their anticipated anxiety in these fields, which in turn is likely to lower their motivation to pursue 
careers in them (e.g., Bian et al., under review; Emerson & Murphy, 2015; Good, Rattan & 
Dweck, 2012; Murphy & Dweck, 2010; Smith et al., 2013). For instance, Good et al. (2012) 
found that when female students perceived their classmates as (1) holding a stereotype against 
women’s math abilities and also (2) viewing math ability as a fixed trait, they were less likely to 
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feel they belonged in math. Their lower sense of belonging in turn predicted less interest in 
pursuing math in the future. This effect extends to business settings as well. Emerson and 
Murphy (2015) found that, after receiving negative feedback, women were more likely to 
disengage from a company where a high level of intelligence was valued than from a company 
where sustained effort was valued. Additional analyses revealed that women’s lack of interest in 
the intelligence-focused company was a result of their lower sense of belonging, which was 
negatively affected by their expectations of being stereotyped in this environment.   
A second potential mechanism is the following: The two elements of the FAB model 
(i.e., the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype and the field-specific ability beliefs) may create a 
more unwelcoming environment that hinders women’s participation. Specifically, given the 
stereotypes against women’s intellectual abilities, members of brilliance-focused fields may 
exhibit bias against them, providing them with fewer opportunities, lower salaries, and fewer 
accolades (e.g., Sugimoto et al., 2013; Milkman et al., 2012, 2015; Moss-Rausin, et al., 2012; 
Sheltzer & Smith, 2014; Wennerås & Wold, 1997; but see Williams & Ceci, 2015, for 
inconsistent results). For instance, before entering academia, women are less likely to get 
responses from faculty when they contact them to discuss research opportunities (Milkman et al., 
2012, 2015). Speaking to the gender bias in opportunities and salary, when faculty members in 
biological and physical sciences were asked to evaluate the suitability of a male or a female 
applicant with identical backgrounds for a lab manager position, they rated the male as more 
suited for the position, were more likely to offer the male mentoring, and provided him a higher 
starting salary (e.g., Moss-Racusin et al., 2012). The female was seen as less suited for the 
position, even though she was exactly as qualified as the male applicant. Even after women 
surmount these challenges and obtain advanced degrees in brilliance-focused fields, they may 
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still face discrimination with respect to their academic productivity and the value of their 
research. For instance, Sugimoto et al. (2013) reported that articles are cited fewer times when 
women are in the most prominent author positions than when men are. Moreover, Wennerås and 
Wold (1997) analyzed the data from the peer review system of the Swedish Medical Research 
Council and found that females were less likely to be awarded postdoctoral fellowships, and 
were perceived as less competent than males who were, in fact, equally productive.  
The Present Research  
Although the FAB hypothesis provides a promising account of the current gender 
disparities across fields, investigations of this hypothesis that focus exclusively on adult 
participants are likely to miss a crucial piece of the puzzle: Cultural messages about the 
presumed cognitive profiles of males and females are likely to be available and influential 
throughout development. If children absorb and act on these ideas, then—by the time they reach 
adulthood—many capable girls are likely to have already veered away from fields that are 
believed to require intellectual talent. Thus, investigating the acquisition and the impact of the 
“brilliance ≠ females” stereotype on children’s development is likely to enhance our 
understanding of the root causes of gender gaps across academia and the industry, as well as our 
ability to intervene effectively at the point where the problem originates.  
Therefore, in the present research, I investigate (1) the development of this negative 
stereotype against women’s intelligence (Chapter 2), (2) how this stereotype affects children’s 
motivation, especially concerning activities portrayed as requiring high levels of intellectual 
ability (Chapter 3), and (3) how this stereotype affects adults’ and children’s evaluation of 
males’ and females’ capabilities (Chapter 4). Before discussing these studies, I review the prior 
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literature on the development of the gender stereotypes about males’ and females’ cognitive 
abilities.  
Although no previous studies have directly investigated the development of this broad 
gender stereotype about intelligence, the existing developmental literature suggests that children 
pick up on gender stereotypes about toy preferences even as early as age 2 or 3 (e.g., Ambady et 
al., 2001; Cvencek, Meltzoff, & Greenwald, 2011; Liben, Bigler, & Krogh, 2001, 2002; Parsons, 
Adler & Kaczala, 1982; Signorella, Bigler, & Liben, 1993). When they reach elementary school 
age, children also begin to acquire stereotypes about dimensions of intellectual competence such 
as mathematics and reading. For example, a recent study by Cvencek et al. (2011) suggested that 
girls have learned and internalized the stereotype against their mathematics abilities by second 
grade (see also Ambady et al., 2001). More strikingly, one study showed that six-year-old girls’ 
math performance decreased after being incidentally exposed to the gender stereotype about 
math (Galdi, Cadinu & Tomasetto, 2014). After coloring a picture of a boy successfully solving a 
math problem and a girl failing to do so, young girls performed worse than boys on a math test. 
These results indicate an influence of the negative stereotype targeting girls’ math ability, which 
was activated by the picture (even though presumably the girls themselves were not consciously 
aware of its activation). Other studies similarly showed that 5- to 7-year-old girls’ math 
performance decreases when their gender identity is activated (e.g., Neuville & Croizet, 2007; 
Tomasetto, Alparone, & Cadinu, 2011). An interesting commonality between the studies just 
described is this sensitive age range, from 5 to 7 years of age, during which the effects of gender 
stereotypes about the intellectual domain (in particular, mathematics) seem to first surface in 
children’s development and begin to affect their behaviors.  
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Importantly, however, no studies we know of have investigated the development of 
“brilliance ≠ females” stereotype, which is broader and potentially much more pernicious than 
the stereotype about mathematics ability. Moreover, how this stereotype interacts with brilliance-
focused messages, which are the other key component of the FAB framework, to affect 
children’s reactions (e.g., motivation) and to create obstacles for them (e.g., bias from others) is 
also unclear. In order to better understand these issues, I conducted six studies that investigate 
the development and consequences of gender stereotypes about intelligence.  
Overview of the Studies  
In Chapter 2, I conducted two studies to investigate the development of the stereotypes 
against women’s intelligence. For this purpose, I created several implicit tasks tapping into 
children’s beliefs about which gender is smarter. These tasks were administered to children aged 
5 to 7 to chart the development of their awareness of the association between “brilliance” and 
males.  
In Chapters 3 and 4, I explored the possible mechanisms through which this stereotype 
might influence children’s interests. In particular, Chapter 3 investigated the development of 
children’s motivation toward novel activities (e.g., games) that are portrayed as requiring high 
levels of intellectual ability. For this purpose, I created two novel games that were portrayed as 
requiring either “brilliance” or “dedication” (counterbalanced across children). I then assessed 
children’s motivation towards the two games and their endorsement of the “brilliance ≠ females” 
stereotypes. The FAB model predicts that girls should begin to show less enthusiasm than boys 
towards the “brilliance” activities at around the same age when they show evidence of having 
learned the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype (see Chapter 2). At a more fine-grained level, we 
also predict that the precise extent to which girls endorse the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype 
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(as measured in our study) should be negatively related to their motivation towards activities 
portrayed as requiring intellectual ability. More generally, children who hold more negative 
stereotypes against their own gender’s intelligence should be less motivated to pursue these 
activities.  
Chapter 4 examined the consequences of the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype for adults’ 
and young children’s explicit evaluation of others’ competence. In Study 5, adult participants 
were asked to nominate two acquaintances for a job position that was described as requiring 
either brilliance or sustained effort. In Study 6, I adapted this procedure for use with 5- to 7-year-
olds. In particular, I created two novel games with different descriptions depending on the 
condition children were randomly assigned to: In one condition, children were told that these 
games are for children who are “really, really smart,” whereas in the other condition (which 
served as a baseline) children heard no information about who the game is for. Children were 
then asked to select teammates with whom to play these games from among a set of unfamiliar 
children (half boys and half girls). The FAB model predicts that adults and 6- to 7-year-old 
children (who have shown some evidence of having learned the “brilliance ≠ females” 
stereotype) would show a bias in favor of males in the conditions where brilliance is emphasized.  
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Chapter 2: The development of the gender stereotype about intelligence 
In this chapter, I describe two studies conducted to investigate the development of the 
stereotype against women’s intelligence in 5- to 7-year-olds. I chose this age range because (1) 
before 5, children may have difficulty grasping concepts that are as complex as intellectual 
capacity (e.g., Nicholls, 1978), and (b) by age 7, children generally acquire most of their 
culture’s gender stereotypes (e.g., Signorella et al., 1993). In addition, this wide age range 
allowed me to test when this stereotype originates and chart its development. In Study 1, I 
examined the extent to which young children associate intelligence with (adult) males. In Study 
2, I explored the generality of these results by examining whether this stereotype also influences 
children’s thinking about young boys’ and girls’ intelligence, not just adult men’s and women’s.  
Study 1 
Participants  
Participants were 32 five-year olds (Mage = 5.55 years, SD = 0.30), 32 six-year olds (Mage 
= 6.50 years, SD = 0.31) and 32 seven-year olds (Mage = 7.46 years, SD = 0.33). Half of them 
were boys and half of them were girls. Children were recruited in a small Midwestern city. 
Twenty-three additional children were tested but excluded from the final sample because of poor 
performance on a set of screener questions (n = 19, see below), because they refused to finish the 
study (n = 3), or because they were more than 2.5 standard deviations from the condition mean 
(n = 1)2.  
Across Studies 1 to 4, demographic information was available for 75% of the families. 
The racial/ethnic composition of the sample mirrored that of the community in which this 
research was conducted: 78% of the children were European American, 7% Asian American, 5% 																																																								
2 We used a uniform 2.5 SD outlier exclusion criterion across studies. The results remained the same without 
excluding the outliers.  
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African American, 3% Latino or Hispanic, and 7% multi-racial. The median household income 
was $90,000 (range = $5,000 - $185,000). Eight-two percent of the parents in the sample had at 
least a bachelor’s degree. Neither race nor socio-economic status (SES) moderated the reported 
effect3 (for more details, see Page 32).   
Materials and procedure  
Children were tested individually in a quiet room in our lab or at their school by a single 
experimenter. The experimenter videotaped the child sessions and recorded the children’s 
responses on an answer form. The experiment consisted of two parts: (1) a screener phase where 
I gauged the child’s understanding of the relevant concepts (e.g., intelligence), and (2) three 
stereotype tasks to assess children’s endorsement of the “brilliance ≠ females” beliefs.  
Screener phase. The experimenter began the study by telling the child that they would 
talk about what “smart” and “nice” (a control trait) mean. “Nice” was chosen as a comparison 
attribute for “smart” because it is as familiar to children but likely not stereotyped in the same 
way in our society (Eagly & Mladinic, 1994; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Then, the 
experimenter said, “I’m going to tell you about some children I know and ask you if you think 
they’re smart/nice”. Children were provided with twelve screener questions, half of them 
gauging their understanding of “smart” and half of them gauging their understanding of “nice.” 
The “smart” and “nice” questions were presented to children as separate blocks whose order was 
counterbalanced. Each of these questions was about a behavior of an unfamiliar child 
accompanied by the child’s picture. The experimenter read off descriptions of each pictured child 
while putting the picture itself behind a little tent so that the subject could not see the gender of 
the child presented in the picture. We concealed the picture so that children’s answers to these 																																																								
3 Because the racial/ethnic minority group in our samples was small, we might not have enough power to detect the 
moderation effect. Thus, the moderation results reported in Studies 1-4 and 6 should be interpreted with caution.  
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questions would not be influenced by the gender of the child in the pictures, and thus these 
answers would not interfere with the subsequent main tasks, where we measured children’s 
gender stereotypes. Next, children were asked to determine if the described child had the target 
trait (smart vs. nice). For the “smart” screener questions, the experimenter asked the child if they 
thought the child in the picture was “smart, not smart, or are you not sure?” by using a scale 
showing a thumbs up, a thumbs down, and a puzzled look. Four descriptions fit the definition of 
the word “smart” (e.g., this child learns things really fast), and the other two served as fillers 
(e.g., this child watches really funny cartoons; see Table 1). For the “nice” screener questions, 
the same scale was used but the question was changed to test if the subject thought the described 
child was “nice, not nice, or are you not sure?” Again, there were four items that fit the definition 
of “nice” (e.g., this child likes to help other people), and two fillers (e.g., this child plays on the 
swings; see Table 1). These answers were used to determine if children understand the meaning 
of the key terms “smart” and “nice.” Children who did not answer correctly at least two thirds of 
the questions either for the “smart” or for the “nice” screener questions were excluded from the 
analysis (n = 19). 
Stereotype tasks. After completing the two screener blocks, the experimenter 
administered three stereotype tasks that tapped children’s implicit stereotypes about males and 
females. These tasks were presented in a random order. 
Gender-neutral story task. This task consisted of two stories, each of which described a 
“special person” while leaving this person’s gender unspecified (see Table 2 for full text). One 
story was about a “really, really smart” person at the experimenter’s workplace who “comes up 
with answers much faster and better than anyone else.” The other one was about a “really, really 
nice” person at the experimenter’s workplace who “likes to help others with their problems and 
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is friendly to everyone at the office.” No clues as to the protagonist’s gender were provided in 
either story. After telling the story, the experimenter laid out four pictures in a line—two of 
which were adult females, and two of which were adult males. The gender of the depicted 
individuals alternated across the four pictures. These pictures, as well as those used in the other 
tasks and in Study 2, were normed on a separate group of adult participants (N = 29) such that 
there were no significant differences between the males and the females in terms of their 
attractiveness or other superficial features (e.g., how professionally they were dressed). 
Additionally, great care was taken to match facial expressions, styles of clothing, etc., across the 
pictures of males and females. All pictures depicted white individuals, as the strength of gender 
stereotypes about intelligence may differ depending on the race of the targets (e.g., Ambady et 
al., 2001; Rowley, Kurtz-Costes, Mistry & Feagans, 2007).  
After hearing the experimenter’s story, children were asked to guess which one of the 
four people might be the person in the story. If children chose a person of the same gender as 
themselves (e.g., if a girl picked a woman), they were assigned a score of 1 for that trial; 
otherwise, they were assigned a 0.  
Guessing task. Children were asked to play a guessing game in which they were shown 
six pairs of individuals and asked to guess which one had more of a certain trait. In the first two 
trials, the two individuals were of the same gender (matching the participant’s own gender). 
These two trials served as practice for the children, and, perhaps more importantly, they also 
helped camouflage the purpose of our study. For the next four trials, children were shown a man 
and a woman.  
On each of the six trials, children were told that one of the two people was “really, really 
smart” (three trials) or “really, really nice” (the other three trials), and they were asked to guess 
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which of the two people in the picture is this target person. The order of the pictures was 
counterbalanced to avoid confounding trait content with particular pictures. Similar to the first 
task, children’s responses were scored as a 1 on a trial if they chose the person of the same 
gender as themselves and 0 otherwise.  
Puzzle task. Children were asked to complete a series of three “matching puzzles.” Each 
puzzle consisted of a two by four table (two rows × four columns), with the top row of the table 
filled with pictures of two females and two males, in alternation. The pictures of individuals 
differed from puzzle to puzzle. However, the four pieces the child was asked to place in the 
bottom row of the table remained the same: one piece had the word “smart” on it, one piece had 
the word “nice,” one piece had a picture of a high heel (stereotypically feminine), and the fourth 
had a picture of a hammer (stereotypically masculine). Children were given the pieces one by 
one (and told the word on them, for the “smart” and “nice” puzzle pieces) and were then asked to 
put these pieces in one of the empty slots on the bottom of the puzzle so as to “match” the 
pictures of the men and women at the top. Children’s answers were scored as a 1 if they matched 
the piece showing “smart” or “nice” with a person of the same gender as themselves, and 0 
otherwise.  
At the end of the sessions, children were thanked for their participation and praised for 
their responses. They also received a small reward for participating in the study. 
Results and Discussion 
Our key prediction was of a three-way interaction between Trait, Gender, and Age: For 
the trait “smart,” we expected that both boys and girls would favor their own gender at the age of 
5, which accords with many prior studies showing that young children believe their gender group 
is the best on most dimensions (e.g., Ambady et al., 2001; Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2011). As 
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children get older, however, girls may become less likely than boys to attribute “being really, 
really smart” to their own gender, leading to a significant Gender × Age interaction for this 
attribute. I did not expect the same pattern to emerge for trait “nice,” hence the prediction of a 
Gender × Age × Trait interaction.  
We submitted children’s stereotype scores to a multilevel mixed-effects linear model 
with trait (smart vs. nice; level-1 predictor), gender (boys vs. girls; level-2 predictor), and age (5- 
vs. 6- vs. 7-year-olds; level-2 predictor), plus all possible interaction terms, as categorical fixed 
effects and a random intercept for participants. The models were computed with the mixed 
command in Stata 14.1.  
The analyses revealed a significant interaction between Gender and Trait, Wald χ² = 
15.09, p < .001. Two follow-up tests indicated that boys were overall more likely than girls to 
associate “smart” with their own gender, Wald χ² = 9.51, p = .002, but boys were less likely than 
girls to associate “nice” with their own gender, Wald χ² = 5.81, p = .016.  
Nevertheless, our main goal was to examine the development of children’s beliefs on 
these matters. As predicted, we found a significant three-way interaction between Age, Gender, 
and Trait, Wald χ² = 10.56, p = .005. Four follow-up tests compared boys’ and girls’ stereotype 
scores about each trait separately for younger (5-year-old) and older (6- and 7-year-old) children, 
which revealed that at 5, girls and boys were not different in their tendency to regard their own 
gender as smarter (Wald χ² = 0.02, p = .893) or nicer (Wald χ² = 0.39, p = .531) than the other 
gender (see Figure 1A and Table 3). These results are consistent with the overwhelming in-group 
positivity previously observed in boys and (especially) girls across early and middle childhood 
(Ambady et al., 2001; Dunham et al., 2011). Despite this strong tendency to view one’s gender in 
a positive light, 6- and 7-year-old girls were less likely to associate “smart” with their own 
	 23 
gender than boys were, Wald χ² = 8.10, p = .004 (see Figure 1A and Table 3). With respect to the 
attribute “nice,” boys at ages 6 and 7 were less likely to associate it with their own gender than 
girls, Wald χ² = 17.70, p < .001, (see Figure 1B and Table 3). These developmental patterns were 
found consistently across the three stereotype tasks. 
These results suggest that our culture’s gender stereotypes about intelligence may begin 
to influence children’s beliefs about which gender is “really, really smart” at a very young age—
perhaps as early as age six. In addition, the stereotype associating females with being nice seems 
to follow a similar developmental trajectory.  
Study 2 
The primary goal of Study 2 was to examine whether this “brilliance ≠ females” 
stereotype also influences children’s thinking about young boys’ and girls’ intelligence, not just 
men’s and women’s. A second goal of Experiment 2 was to explore the potential factors that 
might lead to gender differences in children’s beliefs about who is “really smart.” One plausible 
influence on children’s ideas about intelligence is their perceptions regarding who gets better 
grades in school. Thus, I examined whether children’s perceptions of gender differences in 
school achievement were related to their endorsement of the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype.  
Participants  
Participants were 48 five-year olds (Mage = 5.50 years, SD = 0.33), 48 six-year olds (Mage 
= 6.48 years, SD = 0.25) and 48 seven-year olds (Mage = 7.45 years, SD = 0.28). Half of them 
were boys and half of them were girls. Children were recruited in a small Midwestern city. 
Thirty-one additional children were tested but excluded from the final sample because they failed 
the screener questions (n = 28), refused to complete the study (n = 2) or were more than 2.5 
standard deviations from the condition mean (n = 1). 
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Materials and procedure 
The procedure of Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1, with three exceptions. First, 
each task was separated into two blocks: one with pictures of men and women (identical to those 
in Study 1), and the other with pictures of boys and girls. The order of the two blocks was 
counterbalanced. The pictures of boys and girls used in this study were normed for attractiveness 
(“How attractive does this child look?”) and age (“How old do you think this child is?”) in the 
same sample of 29 Mechanical Turk adults that rated the pictures used in Study 1. Second, 
because the addition of the child targets increased the length of the sessions, we omitted the 
puzzle task to avoid taxing children’s attention spans. Third, at the end of the sessions, we 
assessed children’s perceptions of boys’ and girls’ school achievement. Children first saw 4 
pictures of unfamiliar children (2 boys and 2 girls) and were asked, “If you had to make a guess, 
who do you think gets the best grades in school?” With another set of 4 pictures, they were then 
asked, “If you had to make a guess, who do you think is first in their class?” Finally, participants 
were asked the same 2 questions again, except this time they had to choose between 2 verbally-
presented options: “boys or girls?” Responses across these 4 items were coded as in the 
stereotype tasks (same-gender choice = 1; other-gender choice = 0) and averaged. 
Results and discussion 
We predicted that the results would parallel those in Study 1. We did not have strong a 
priori predictions regarding whether children’s gender stereotypes about intelligence would 
depend on the age of the target (child vs. adult).  
We first submitted children’s stereotype scores to a multilevel mixed-effects linear model 
with trait (smart vs. nice; level-1 predictor), target (adults vs. children; level-1 predictor), gender 
(boys vs. girls; level-2 predictor), and age (younger vs. older children; level-2 predictor), plus all 
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possible interaction terms, as categorical fixed effects and a random intercept for participants. 
The models were computed with the mixed command in Stata 14.1.  
The results revealed a significant interaction between Gender and Trait, Wald χ² = 45.87, 
p < .001. Two follow-up tests indicated that, as in Study 1, boys were overall more likely than 
girls to associate “smart” with their own gender, Wald χ² = 6.21, p = .013, but they were less 
likely than girls to associate “nice” with their own gender, Wald χ² = 31.71, p < .001. 
The main goal was, again, to examine the developmental timeline of children’s 
association between brilliance and males, as well as whether this association is moderated by the 
age of the target (children vs. adults). As predicted, we found a significant three-way interaction 
between Age, Gender, and Trait, Wald χ² = 7.73, p = .021. As illustrated in Figure 1C, follow-up 
tests indicated that at the age of 5, girls and boys were not different in their tendency to regard 
their own gender group as smarter than the other gender group, Wald χ² = 0.01, p = .936. 
However, 6- and 7-year-old girls were less likely to associate “smart” with their own gender than 
boys, Wald χ² = 9.63, p = .002 (see Figure 1C and Table 3). This pattern did not differ 
significantly by whether children rated adult vs. child targets, Wald χ² = 1.53, p = .46. With 
respect to the attribute “nice,” both younger (Wald χ² = 4.31, p = .038) and older boys (Wald χ² = 
29.35, p < .001) were less likely than girls to associate it with their own gender (see Figure 1D 
and Table 3).  Again, these developmental patterns were found consistently across the two 
stereotype tasks.  
What might explain the drop in girls’ evaluation of their gender’s intellectual abilities? 
Although many factors are likely involved, in Study 2 we tested whether this drop is associated 
with differences between younger (5-year-old) and older (6- and 7-year-old) girls in their 
perceptions of their school achievement—information that is in principle relevant to judging 
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intelligence. In contrast with the drop in brilliance scores, there was no significant difference 
between younger and older girls in the likelihood of selecting same-gender children (i.e., other 
girls) as having top grades, t(70)= 0.22, p = .826 (see Figure 2). Older girls were actually more 
likely to select same-gender children as having top grades than older boys were, t(94)= 4.41, p < 
.001, consistent with the reality that girls get better grades in school than boys at this age (Voyer 
& Voyer, 2014). Nevertheless, there was no significant correlation between girls’ perceptions of 
school achievement and their perceptions of brilliance, r(72) = .11, p = .343 (for boys: r(72) = 
.38, p = .001). Thus, girls’ ideas about who is brilliant are not rooted in their perceptions of who 
performs well in school. However, other aspects of children’s experiences in school, such as 
teachers’ attitudes and biases (e.g., Beilock, Gunderson, Ramirez, & Levine, 2010; Robinson-
Cimpian et al., 2014) may still be implicated in the development of this stereotype.	
The distributions of children at each age who associated males with brilliance. To 
characterize these distributions, we combined the data from Studies 1 and 2, and categorized 
children into three groups based on the extent to which they favored their own gender as brilliant 
across the 6 responses they had to make (2 responses per task × 3 tasks): Children were classified 
into the “favoring their own gender” category if they selected members of their own gender as 
brilliant on at least 4/6 trials, into the “favoring the other gender” category if they selected 
members of the other gender as brilliant on at least 4/6 trials, and as “neutral” otherwise. 
Examination of distribution of individual children who fell into these three categories at age 5, 6, 
and 7 reinforces the conclusions of the analyses reported above (see Table 4). For example, 16 
out of 40 girls aged 6 were categorized as “favoring the other gender” compared to only 2 out of 
40 girls aged 5, χ²(1, N = 80) = 14.67, p = .001. However, the number of boys in the “favoring 
the other gender” category was similar (and low) across these two ages (5-year-olds: 8/40; 6-
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year-olds: 7/40), χ²(1, N = 80) = 0.09, p = .958. Similar patterns were found when comparing 5-
year-olds’ responses with 7-year-olds’. In summary, these distributional analyses provided 
converging evidence for the developmental trajectories. 
Moderation analyses with race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status (SES). Do children 
from different racial/ethnic backgrounds have different beliefs about which gender is “really, 
really smart” and which is “really, really nice”? Because each of the racial/ethnic minority 
groups in our sample (e.g., African Americans, Latinos) was small, we combined them into a 
single group for purposes of this analysis. To increase the power to detect differences by 
race/ethnicity, we also pooled the data from Studies 1 and 2. We then submitted these data to a 
multilevel mixed-effects linear model with race/ethnicity (white children vs. children of color; 
level-2 predictor), trait (smart vs. nice; level-1 predictor), gender (boys vs. girls; level-2 
predictor), and age (5- [younger] vs. 6- and 7-year-olds [older]; level-2 predictor), plus all 
possible interaction terms, as categorical fixed effects and a random intercept for participants. 
Contrary to the idea that the development of the stereotypes investigated here varies by 
racial/ethnic group, we found that race/ethnicity did not significantly moderate the key three-way 
interaction among Trait, Gender, and Age, Wald χ² = 0.15, p = .70. Inspection of the means 
revealed broadly similar developmental patterns. For example, own-gender brilliance scores 
decreased with age for both white girls (Myounger = .67 vs. Molder = .49) and girls of color (Myounger 
= .83 vs. Molder = .60).  
Do children from high- vs. low-SES backgrounds have different beliefs about which 
gender is “really, really smart” and which is “really, really nice”? To examine this question, we 
first created a composite SES measure by (1) standardizing the average education level of the 
parent(s) (which had been converted to years of education prior to standardizing) and the total 
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income of the household, and then (2) averaging these two scores (education and income) into a 
composite SES variable. Next, we performed the same multilevel analysis as above, except that 
race/ethnicity was replaced by SES. Again, we found that SES did not significantly moderate the 
key three-way interaction among trait, gender, and age, Wald χ² = 0.58, p = .45. Inspection of the 
means revealed similar developmental trends for high- and low-SES children. For example, both 
high-SES (+1 SD) girls and low-SES (−1 SD) girls showed age-related drops in their own-gender 
brilliance scores (high-SES girls: Myounger = .71 vs. Molder = .49; low-SES girls: Myounger = .71 vs. 
Molder = .53). 
Conclusion. In conclusion, the first two studies provide consistent evidence suggesting 
that, starting at around the age of 6, many children already associate brilliance with males. 
Consistent with previous research on stereotypes about mathematics, our findings revealed that 
girls’ tendency to associate intelligence with their own gender begins to decrease when they are 
first exposed to school, whereas boys perceive their own gender as smarter across this 
developmental milestone. One possible explanation for this divergence may be that school entry 
brings with it greater exposure to cultural messages about the greater intellectual abilities of 
males. For example, parents predict that their sons’ IQ is higher than their daughters’, regardless 
of which child’s IQ is actually higher (Neto & Furnham, 2011; Kirkcaldy, 2007). These beliefs 
might be transferred to children via parent-child daily interactions about competence and 
achievement (Cimpian, Arce, Markman, & Dweck, 2007; Pomerantz & Kempner, 2013), which 
may become more frequent when children enter school. Similarly, young girls face negative 
stereotypes against their intelligence in schools as well, since teachers have the same perceptions 
as parents—that a boy’s IQ and natural intelligence surpasses that of an equally-achieving girl. 
Moreover, in the media, most “brilliant” professionals are still portrayed by men, whereas 
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women are more likely to portrayed in roles that highlight their nurturing traits (e.g., nurses, 
babysitters) (e.g., Paek, Nelson, & Vilela, 2010). Interestingly, our findings revealed that girls’ 
ideas about intelligence are not related to their perceptions of school achievement. Although 
young girls perceive their gender as doing better in school, this perception has no bearing on who 
they perceive to be “really, really smart.” Further research is needed to examine the stark 
discrepancy between the two types of perceptions.  
Given our findings so far, the period before the age of 6 might be a sensitive stage during 
which interventions might be most effective in buffering children against the potential negative 
effects of these stereotypes. By addressing this problem at its developmental root, we may have a 
better chance of putting young men and women on equal playing fields with regard to how they 
perceive their own intellectual abilities. By doing so, we might also reduce the gender gaps that 
persist in many fields and careers. 
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Chapter 3: The effect of the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype on children’s interest 
In this chapter, I investigate how the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype influences 
children’s motivation toward novel activities (e.g., games) that are portrayed as requiring high 
levels of intellectual ability. The FAB model makes two predictions: First, given the results 
above, brilliance-focused messages should undermine 6- and 7-year-old girls’ (but not 5-year-old 
girls’) motivation, just as they undermine the motivation of women in our adult studies (Bian et 
al., under review). Second, children’s endorsement of the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype 
should predict their motivation towards activities portrayed as requiring brilliance: Children who 
hold more negative stereotypes against their own gender’s intelligence should be less motivated 
to pursue these activities. 
These predictions are reinforced by two lines of work that pertain to gender development: 
First, the literature on the development of gender identity suggests that, from a young age, 
children are sensitive to the “typical” characteristics of their gender group and conform to these 
characteristics (for reviews, see Martin & Ruble, 2004; Martin, Ruble, & Szkrybalo, 2002; 
Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). Thus, rather than being suspicious of implicit suggestions that 
girls are “hard workers” and boys are “the smart ones,” young girls may in fact willingly 
incorporate such stereotyped beliefs into their self-concepts. Second, there is considerable 
evidence that gender stereotypes shape children’s behaviors, including their activity choices 
(e.g., Ambady et al., 2001; Cimpian, Mu, & Erickson, 2012; Martin, Eisenbud, & Rose, 1995; 
McKown & Weinstein, 2003; Neuville & Croizet, 2007; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). In other 
words, children may act on the basis of the stereotypes they learn from those around them and 
from the broader cultural messages to which they are exposed.  
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Study 3 
In this study, 6- to 7-year-old children were introduced to two novel games, one said to 
be for “children who are really, really smart” and the other for “children who try really, really 
hard.” Then, I measured children’s motivation toward each game. At the end, children received a 
modified version of the gender-neutral story task used in Studies 1 and 2 to assess their gender 
stereotypes about intelligence.  
Participants  
Participants were 32 six-year olds (Mage = 6.50 years, SD = 0.31) and 32 seven-year olds 
(Mage = 7.44 years, SD = 0.33). Half of them were boys and half of them were girls. Children 
were recruited in a small Midwestern city. One additional children were tested but excluded from 
the final sample because they were more than 2.5 standard deviations from the condition mean.  
Materials and procedure 
Children were introduced to two novel games (“zarky” and “impok”) in counterbalanced 
order. For each game, the experimenter showed children a picture of it and briefly described its 
“rules” (see Table 5). Crucially, one game was said to be for “children who are really, really 
smart,” and the other was said to be for “children who try really, really hard.” As a 
comparison/control for “brilliance,” I chose “dedication” because (1) effort is an important 
ingredient for success, and (2) this dimension is not stereotypically associated with males more 
than females (e.g., Smith et al., 2013; Tiedemann, 2000), so we can expect it to behave 
differently. Each game was presented in “smart” format for half of the participants and in “try 
hard” format for the other half. To ensure that children encoded the crucial “smart” vs. “try hard” 
information about each game, the experimenter asked them to recall it before proceeding to the 
main set of questions and corrected them if necessary.  
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Next, the experimenter asked 4 questions designed to gauge children’s interest in the 
game (e.g., “Would you want to play the zarky/impok game, or would you not want to play it?”; 
see Table 6). The order of the questions was randomized. After the first two questions, children 
were provided with a reminder of the relevant ability information (i.e., that the game is for 
children who are “really, really smart” vs. who “try really, really hard”). Responses to the four 
questions were standardized (so that they are on the same scale) and then averaged.  
After an abbreviated, simplified set of screener questions (which all children passed), we 
assessed children’s brilliance stereotypes with the gender-neutral story from Studies 1 and 2. 
However, before children selected the protagonist of the story from among the 4 pictures 
provided (as in Studies 1 and 2), we also asked them to repeat the story and then coded the 
gender of the pronouns they used. This task was adapted from Ambady et al. (2001). The final 
stereotype score in this study was an average of these two items (the pronouns they used and the 
pictures they selected; standardized before averaging).  
At the end of the sessions, children received a thorough debriefing that was designed to 
convey that effort and hard work are the key to success (e.g., “If you try really hard and practice 
a lot, you can be good at any game you want”).  
Results and discussion 
The FAB hypothesis makes two major predictions. First, there should be an interaction 
between Gender and Condition (smart vs. try-hard; within subject) on children’s motivation 
toward the novel activities. Specifically, the 6- and 7-year-old girls in this study should be less 
interested in the smart game (but not the try-hard game) than boys. Second, children’s 
endorsement of the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype should be related to their motivation toward 
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the smart game: Children who hold more negative stereotypes against their own gender’s 
intelligence should be less motivated to pursue the “brilliance-focused” activities. 
To test the first prediction, I submitted children’s interest scores (combined across the 4 
questions) to a multilevel mixed-effects linear model with game (smart vs. try-hard; level-1 
predictor), gender (boys vs. girls; level-2 predictor), and age (6- vs. 7-year-olds; level-2 
predictor), plus all possible interaction terms, as categorical fixed effects and a random intercept 
for participants. As expected, the interaction between gender and game was significant, Wald χ² 
= 5.42, p = .020. Two follow-up tests comparing boys’ and girls’ interest in each game revealed 
that 6- and 7-year-old girls were less interested than boys in the game for smart children, Wald χ² 
= 4.02, p = .045, but not in the game for hard-working children, Wald χ² = 0.53, p = .47 (see 
Figure 3A and Table 7).  
Before testing the second prediction, I conducted an independent-samples t test to 
examine if we could replicate the previous results. Consistent with our previous findings, 6- and 
7-year-old girls’ own-gender brilliance perceptions were significantly lower than boys’, t(61) = 
2.40, p = .020. Next, to explore whether the gender differences in interest are related to 
children’s beliefs about brilliance, I submitted the data to a bootstrapped (10,000 replications) 
product-of-coefficients mediation test by using the PROCESS macro in SPSS 22 (Model 4; 
Hayes, 2013). Children’s gender (0 = boys, 1 = girls) was the independent variable in this 
analysis; the own-gender brilliance score was the mediator; and children’s interest in the smart 
vs. the try-hard game (a difference score) was the dependent variable. The results suggested that 
these stereotyped beliefs mediated the relationship between children’s gender and their interest in 
the game for brilliant (vs. persistent) children, indirect effect = −.11, 95% confidence interval = 
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[−.33, −.004] (see Figure 4). Thus, young children’s emerging notions about who is likely to be 
brilliant are one of the factors that guide their decisions about which activities to pursue. 
These findings provide the first piece of evidence suggesting that the messages 
emphasizing the importance of intellectual talent to success affect girls’ motivation via their 
beliefs about such talent. It is possible that, by the time they reach adulthood, many capable girls 
have already veered away from fields that are generally believed to require raw intellectual 
talent, which are some of the most prestigious and lucrative careers in our society. 
Study 4 
In Study 4, I compared 5- and 6-year-old boys’ and girls’ interest in novel games said to 
be “for children who are really, really smart”. The prediction was that 5-year-old boys’ and girls’ 
interest in these games would not differ, since their ideas about brilliance are not yet 
differentiated (Figure 1A and 1C). In contrast, 6-year-old girls’ interest was predicted to be lower 
than boys’, in line with the results of Study 3. 
Participants  
Participants were 48 five-year olds (Mage = 5.40 years, SD = 0.31) and 48 six-year olds 
(Mage = 6.52 years, SD = 0.31). Half of them were boys, and half of them were girls. Children 
were recruited in a small Midwestern city. Two additional children were tested but excluded 
from the final sample because they were more than 2.5 standard deviations from the condition 
mean.  
Materials and procedure 
The procedure of Study 4 was identical to that of Study 3, except children were only told 
about the game “for children who are really, really smart.” Half of the children saw the “zarky” 
game, and half saw the “impok” game. 
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Results and discussion 
I predicted that we would replicate the results of the preceding study with this study’s 
sample of 6-year olds. However, since children at age 5 show little awareness of the “brilliance ≠ 
females” stereotype, I predicted that boys and girls of this age would not differ in their interest in 
the brilliance game. Overall, this would give rise to a Gender ´ Age interaction. To investigate 
these predictions, children’s interest scores were submitted to a linear regression with gender 
(boys vs. girls), age (5- vs. 6-year-olds), and their interaction as categorical predictors. Standard 
errors were bootstrapped (10,000 replications). As expected, the interaction between Gender and 
Age was marginally significant, Wald χ² = 3.12, p = .078. Follow-ups testing gender differences 
in children’s interest at each age level revealed no significant gender differences in interest 
among 5-year-olds, Wald χ² = 0.55, p = .46, and a trend in the predicted direction among 6-year-
olds, Wald χ² = 3.66, p = .056 (see Figure 3B and Table 7). Combining the samples of 6- and 7-
year-olds from Studies 3 and 4 with a random-effects meta-analysis (Cumming, 2013), we 
estimated the magnitude of the difference in boys’ vs. girls’ interest toward the game for brilliant 
children to be d = .51, 95% confidence interval = [.13, .88], p = .008.  
Overall, Studies 3 and 4 provide coherent evidence suggesting that, beginning at the age 
of 6, girls start to shy away from novel activities said to be for children who are “really, really 
smart.” Moreover, their interest towards these activities was predicted by their beliefs about 
which gender is brilliant. Thus, these results speak to the immediate impact that these 
stereotyped notions have on children’s interests.  
Moderation analyses with race/ethnicity and SES. To examine if children’s 
race/ethnicity moderates the observed gender differences in interest toward the smart game, we 
submitted this dependent variable (pooled across Studies 3 and 4) to a linear regression with 
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race/ethnicity (white children vs. children of color), gender (boys vs. girls), age (5- [younger] vs. 
6- and 7-year-olds [older]), and all their two- and three-way interactions as categorical 
predictors. Similar to the analysis of children’s stereotypes, children’s racial/ethnic backgrounds 
did not significantly moderate the key Age × Gender interaction in children’s interest toward the 
smart game, Wald χ² = 1.48, p = .22. For example, 6- and 7-year-old girls displayed lower 
interest in the smart game than 6- and 7-year-old boys regardless of their racial/ethnic group 
(white children: Mboys = .25 vs. Mgirls = −.22; children of color: Mboys = .19 vs. Mgirls = −.23).  
Like race/ethnicity, SES did not significantly moderate the Age × Gender interaction in 
children’s interest toward the smart game, Wald χ² = 0.01, p = .96. For example, 6- and 7-year-
old girls’ interest in the smart game was lower than 6- and 7-year-old boys’ interest regardless of 
whether they came from high-SES (Mboys = .08 vs. Mgirls = −.22) or low-SES (Mboys = .34 vs. 
Mgirls = −.22) families. 
Alternative explanations. We considered two possible alternative explanations for the 
results of Studies 1–4. One alternative explanation suggests that, because boys are sometimes 
held back from entering the formal schooling system (Huang, 2015), their understanding of 
intellectual ability may be delayed relative to girls’ (Eccles, Midgley, & Adler, 1984), which 
may inflate boys’ confidence about their brilliance (Butler, 2005). To examine this alternative, 
we combined the schooling status information across Studies 1 to 4, which was available for 
34% of the children. Of the children for whom we had this information, 5% were in preschool, 
21% in kindergarten, 11% in kindergarten or first grade (some schools in our sample combined 
these grades), 42% in first grade, and 20% in second grade or higher. Contrary to this 
explanation, the boys and girls in our sample did not enter school at different ages (e.g., the 
average chronological age for first-grade boys and girls was 6.87 and 6.72 years, respectively; 
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t(55) = 1.28, p = .204). (The children in the combined kindergarten/first grade program were not 
included in these analyses.)  Moreover, own-gender brilliance scores did not differ for boys who 
had vs. had not already entered first grade (Mbefore = .70 vs. Mafter = .67; t = 0.33, p = .743), but 
these scores differed for girls (Mbefore = .71 vs. Mafter = .56; t = 2.16, p = .037).  
Another alternative explanation suggests that, because women are subject to stronger 
modesty norms than men (Rudman, 1998), perhaps 6- and 7-year-old girls’ lower interest in the 
games for brilliant children (Studies 3 and 4) was due to an increase in concerns about modesty. 
Contrary to this alternative, children in the age range we tested are notoriously boastful about 
their abilities (Butler, 2005). Moreover, the difference in boys’ vs. girls’ interest in the brilliance 
games was specifically mediated by their perceptions about brilliance, identifying these 
stereotyped perceptions (rather than modesty) as an underlying mechanism. Notably, our 
measure of the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype is not susceptible to the modesty explanation: 
Modesty norms dictate that a woman should not boast about her own smarts (Smith & Huntoon, 
2013; Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke, & Hertel, 2015), whereas we asked 
children to judge whether other people were smart. Overall, these alternatives do not provide 
convincing explanations for our results.  
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Chapter 4: The effect of the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype on adults’ and children’s 
evaluation of others’ capabilities 
In this chapter, I explored how the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype influences adults’ 
and children’s evalution of boys’ and girls’ competence, especially for activities that are 
portrayed as requiring high levels of intellectual ability. Specifically, I examined whether 
participants doubt whether women will be successful in such activities and are thus less likely to 
select or nominate women for them.  
The FAB model makes two predictions: First, adults and children should be more likely 
to select or nominate males (vs. females) for activities that are said to require brilliance, but not 
for other, control activities (e.g., ones are said to require dedication), suggesting that the 
messages emphasizing the importance of intellectual talent to success give rise to bias favoring 
men over women (Studies 5 and 6). Second, this bias should be moderated by people’s beliefs 
about brilliance. The more strongly participants endorse the stereotypes that associate brilliance 
with males, the more likely they should be to offer opportunities that seemingly require brilliance 
to males (Study 5).   
Study 5 
Participants  
Participants (N = 347; Mage =34.58; 140 men and 207 women) were recruited from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. They were paid $0.50 for participation. Sixty-seven 
additional participants were excluded because their IP addresses indicated they resided outside of 
the US (n = 12), because they explicitly reported (during debriefing) that they had not paid 
attention (n = 2), because they didn’t provide responses on the main dependent measure (n = 1), 
or because they failed an attention check (n = 52; see below). 
	 39 
Materials and procedure 
All participants completed the study online, on Qualtrics. At the beginning, participants 
were asked to imagine a hypothetical scenario that they are “working in the human resources 
department of a big company” that “is looking to fill a couple of positions in their workforce.” 
Then they were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions: Brilliance or Dedication.  
Next, we presented participants with a description of the ideal candidates that the 
company is looking for. Participants in the Brilliance condition were told that the ideal 
candidates should “have a high IQ, superior reasoning skills, and a knack for big, bold ideas”, 
whereas participants in the Dedication condition were told that the ideal candidates should “be 
highly motivated, have an outstanding work ethic and a superior commitment to doing their work 
as well as possible” (see Table 8 for full job descriptions). After reading the description, 
participants were given a memory test in which they were asked to select from a longer list the 
required skills mentioned in the description. Their responses served as an attention check. 
Participants were retained in the analyses if they (1) selected at least one of the traits relevant to 
their condition, and (2) did not select any of the traits relevant to the other condition (e.g., 
“intelligent” in the Dedication condition). Fifty-two participants did not meet these criteria and 
were excluded from the analyses.4 Participants were then provided a reminder of the 
requirements to make sure they fully encoded the information at the core of our manipulation. 
Participants were then asked to nominate two people for the job they read about. In each 
nomination round, they were asked to suggest a relative, a friend, or an acquaintance for the job. 
The gender of this recommended person was the key dependent variable of our study. Responses 
were scored as a 1 if participants suggested a man, and 0 if they suggested a woman. In order to 
																																																								
4 The results remained the same if we included the data from the participants who failed the attention check.   
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mask the purpose of the study, participants were asked to provide other demographic information 
about the person they nominated, not just their gender (e.g., first name, age, relationship to the 
participant). Participants were also asked to justify why they selected this person. To maximize 
the likelihood that they considered the brilliance vs. dedication requirements while making the 
selections, we asked participants to think about the required traits and reminded them of the 
description before they nominated the second teammate.  
Next, we assessed participants’ endorsement of the stereotype against women’s 
intellectual abilities using eight items (e.g., “On average, men tend to have higher intellectual 
capacities than women”; see Table 9). These items were averaged into an overall stereotype 
score (α = .90). 
Finally, participants answered a brief demographics questionnaire, and they received a 
debriefing. 
Results and discussion 
The dependent variable in the study was the gender of the nominated person on each 
round (male = 1, female = 0). Our overall prediction was that participants would be more likely 
to recommend males than females for the Brilliance job, but not the Dedication job. In the 
context of this task, this broad prediction translates into two more-specific possibilities: First, we 
expect a significant main effect of Condition (i.e., males should be recommended more often for 
the Brilliance job than for the Dedication job). Second, we might also expect a significant 
interaction between Condition and Stereotype Endorsement, with the bias to favor males for the 
Brilliance job being particularly strong for people who are high (vs. low) in endorsement of 
brilliance stereotypes. 
To test these predictions, we conducted a mixed-effects logistic regression using the 
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xtmelogit command in Stata. In this logistic regression, we modeled the gender of the 
recommended acquaintance on each round as a function of (1) the gender of the participant (men 
vs. women; level-2 predictor), (2) condition (Brilliance vs. Dedication; level-2 predictor), (3) 
nomination round (first vs. second; level-1 predictor), as well as (4) stereotype endorsement 
(continuous variable; level-2 predictor). In addition, the model included all two-, three-, and 
four-way interactions among the variables and a random intercept for participants.  
Consistent with our first prediction, we found a significant main effect of condition, b = 
−.50, SE = .16, z = −3.07, p = .002, as participants were more likely to nominate a male for the 
Brilliance job (M = 0.59, SD = 0.03) than for the Dedication job (M = 0.48, SD = 0.03; see 
Figure 5). In fact, participants were more likely to recommend a male than a female for the 
Brilliance job, t(168) = 3.60, p < .001, but not for the Dedication job, t(177) = 0.81, p = 0.420.  
Moreover, the analyses also revealed a significant interaction among Brilliance vs. 
Dedication condition, stereotype endorsement, and nomination round, b = -.37, SE = .19, z = -
2.00, p = .045. Specifically, people were more likely to recommend a male for the Brilliance job 
than for the Dedication job on the first round, regardless of the extent to which they endorse the 
stereotype associating brilliance with males (low-stereotype group [1 SD below the mean]: z = 
−3.18, p = .001; high-stereotype group [1 SD above the mean]: z = −2.03, p = .042). However, 
participants’ favoritism towards males in the second round depended on their endorsement of the 
stereotype. In particular, people in the high-stereotype group (but not in the low-stereotype 
group) were more likely to nominate males for the Brilliance position than for the Dedication 
position, z = −2.06, p = .040.  
In addition, the analyses revealed several other main effects and interactions. First, there 
was a significant main effect of participants’ gender, b = 1.00, SE = .17, z = 5.93, p < .001, 
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indicating that male participants were more likely to recommend male acquaintances than female 
participants overall, which accords with people’s general tendency to prefer their own gender 
(e.g., Dunham et al., 2011). Second, the main effect of stereotype endorsement was marginally 
significant, b = 0.09, SE = .05, z = 1.85, p = .064, suggesting that the more people agree with the 
stereotype against women’s intellectual abilities, the more likely they were to nominate men as 
candidates in both conditions. This finding is consistent with the literature on gender 
discrimination (e.g., Moss-Racusin et al., 2012). Third, we found a significant effect of 
nomination round, b = −.34, SE = .16, z = -2.11, p = .035, reflecting people’s tendency to 
recommend more males on the first round than on the second round. Lastly, the analyses 
uncovered a marginally significant two-way interaction between condition and nomination 
round, b = .62, SE = .33, z = 1.91, p = .057. Specifically, participants tended to choose more 
males for the Brilliance job than for the Dedication job on the first selection, z = −3.53, p < .001, 
but not on the second selection, z = −0.68, p = .496. 
In summary, participants were more likely to nominate men than women for “brilliance 
required” positions, but not “dedication required” positions, suggesting that messages 
emphasizing the importance of brilliance to success give rise to bias favoring men over women. 
Moreover, this bias is moderated by the stereotypes against women’s intellectual abilities. 
Specifically, the bias in favor of men is stronger among people who are more likely to endorse 
these stereotypes. Overall, these results are consistent with our hypothesis that men are being 
favored over women in contexts where success is thought to depend largely on being brilliant. 
Study 6 
The primary goal of Study 6 was to investigate whether the biases favoring males in 
“brilliance required” contexts are already present in childhood. If even young children hold these 
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biases, then—from early on—girls may start facing stronger barriers than boys in their pursuit of 
intellectually-demanding educational opportunities, which might eventually lead to the current 
gender imbalance. Thus, investigating the development of these biases is likely to enhance our 
understanding of the roots of gender disparities, as well as our ability to intervene effectively at 
the point where the problem originates. 
A secondary goal here was to test an alternative explanation for the results of Study 5. In 
principle, one might argue that the Brilliance vs. Dedication differences found in Study 5 are just 
due to a preference for women in dedication-oriented contexts (rather than a preference for men 
in brilliance-oriented contexts). This alternative is not entirely consistent with the results of 
Study 5, since participants were actually gender-neutral in their recommendations in the 
Dedication condition (48% men, 52% women) rather than favoring females. In contrast, they did 
favor males in the Brilliance condition (59% men, 41% women). Nevertheless, the present 
experiment provides a more direct test of this alternative explanation by comparing a Brilliance 
condition with a Baseline condition, in which neither brilliance nor dedication was mentioned. 
Our prediction is that children would provide fewer opportunities to girls in the Brilliance 
condition, but not in the Baseline condition.  
Moreover, we asked children to evaluate unfamiliar targets. In contrast, participants in 
Study 5 nominated familiar people for certain positions. This change was implemented so that 
participants could not rely on their prior knowledge of the individuals they are selecting. To the 
extent that children in Study 6 choose fewer girls for the Brilliance than the Baseline game, they 
would do so because of their abstract beliefs about boys vs. girls (i.e., their stereotypes), not 
because of their specific knowledge about certain individuals.   
Participants  
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The participants were 64 five-year-old children (Mage = 5.44 years, SD = 0.28; 32 girls 
and 32 boys), 64 six-year-old children (Mage = 6.52 years, SD = 0.33; 32 girls and 32 boys), and 
64 seven-year-old children (Mage = 7.46 years, SD = 0.29; 32 girls and 32 boys). Children were 
recruited in a small Midwestern city in the United States. They were tested either in a university 
lab (N = 57) or in a quiet room at their school (N = 135). Two additional children were tested but 
excluded from the sample because they refused to complete the study.  
Demographic information was available for 71% of the families. The racial/ethnic 
composition of the sample mirrored that of the community in which this research was conducted: 
69% of the children were European American, 9% Asian American, 5% African American, 3% 
Latino or Hispanic, 1% other (parents did not specify), and 12% multi-racial. The median 
household income was $90,000 (range = $4,500 - $185,000). Seventy-seven percent of the 
parents in the sample had at least a bachelor’s degree. Neither race nor socio-economic status 
(SES) moderated the reported effect (for more details, see page 52).  
Materials and procedure  
Children were told about two novel games (“Zorb” and “Tever”). The experimenter 
introduced each game by showing children a picture and providing them with a brief description 
(see Table 10). After hearing about each game, the children who had been randomly assigned to 
the Brilliance condition were provided with the following information: “This game is not for 
everyone. It’s only for children who are really, really smart. Only smart children can be good at 
this game.” Children in the Baseline condition were not provided with this information. To 
ensure that children encoded the manipulation, the experimenter then asked children in the 
Brilliance condition to recall who would be good at this game and corrected them if needed.  
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Next, children were told that “this is a team game” and that they need to choose three 
teammates to play the game with. They were then shown six pictures of unfamiliar children 
(three boys and three girls), and they were asked to pick three children as their teammates. The 
pairing between the pictures of children and particular games (Zorb vs. Tever) was 
counterbalanced across subjects so that no perceptual cues about these children consistently co-
occurred with the descriptions or other features of the games. After the first two selections, 
children in the Brilliance condition were provided with a reminder of the relevant ability 
messages to make sure they could still consider this information in making their selections. On 
each selection, children received a score of 1 if they chose a boy, and a score of 0 if they chose a 
girl. 
After completing all three selections, children received a thorough debriefing	(e.g., “If 
you try really hard and practice a lot, you can be good at any game you want”). At the end of the 
sessions, children were thanked for their participation and praised for their responses. 
Results and discussion  
As in Study 5, we submitted our data to a mixed-effects logistic regression using the 
xtmelogit command in Stata. Specifically, we modeled the gender of the chosen teammate on 
each round as a function of (1) the gender of the participant (boy vs. girl; level-2 predictor), (2) 
condition (Brilliance vs. Baseline; level-2 predictor), (3) selection round (first vs. second vs. 
third; level-1 predictor), and (4) the age of the participant (level-2 predictor). In addition, the 
model included all two-, three-, and four-way interactions among the variables and a random 
intercept for participants. 
Unsurprisingly, we found a significant effect of gender, b = 2.58, SE = 0.25, z = 10.25, p 
< .001, suggesting that boys were more likely than girls to choose boys as teammates. In fact, 
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both boys’ and girls’ tendency to choose their own gender was significantly higher than chance 
(boys: t(95) = 7.94, p < .001; girls: t(95) = 11.25, p < .001). These results are consistent with the 
general tendency to favor one’s own gender group (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011).  
Despite this strong favoritism towards one’s own gender, there was a significant 
interaction between gender and condition, b = −0.98, SE = 0.46, z = -2.11, p = .035. In particular, 
boys’ tendency to pick boys as teammates did not vary significantly by condition, but girls 
tended to pick more boys for the Brilliance than for the Baseline game (see Figure 6). These 
findings suggest that the messages emphasizing brilliance promote young children’s (especially 
girls’) biases favoring males.  
The analyses also uncovered a significant interaction between condition and selection 
round, b = .44, SE = .19, z = 2.28, p = .022. Follow-up tests revealed that children’s tendency to 
pick boys did not differ in the two conditions on the first (z = −0.72, p = .474) or the second 
selections (z = 0.62, p = .533), but they picked more boys for the Brilliance than for the Baseline 
game on the third selection (z = 2.29, p = .022).  
We found the interaction between gender and condition was not moderated by age, b = 
−0.47, SE = 0.53, z = −0.88, p = .379. This result contrasts with those of Studies 1 and 2, in 
which 5-year-olds behaved differently from older children. What might explain this apparent 
discrepancy? First, this teammate-selection task might be more implicit than the stereotype tasks 
used in Studies 1 and 2, because (1) children were not asked to directly indicate which person is 
smart and (2) they were provided with more options (three boys and three girls). The implicitness 
of the task might diminish the tendency to select one’s own group and allow the bias favoring 
males to surface even in young children’s selections. In addition, choosing the right teammate in 
this study has direct consequences for whether children’s team will win, which might serve as 
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extra impetus for children to rely on their (stereotyped) beliefs about who is brilliant rather than 
ingroup favoritism to make their selections. 
Moderation analyses with race/ethnicity and SES. To examine if children’s 
race/ethnicity moderates the observed gender by condition interaction on children’s evaluation of 
others’ competence, we submitted our data to a linear regression with race/ethnicity (white 
children vs. children of color), gender (boys vs. girls), age (continuous variable), condition 
(smart vs. baseline), and all their two-, three-, and four-way interactions as predictors. The 
results revealed that children’s racial/ethnic backgrounds did not significantly moderate the 
gender × condition interaction in children’s tendency to select teammates for the smart game, 
Wald χ² = 0.14, p = .710. For example, girls tended to pick more boys for the smart game than 
for the baseline game, regardless of their racial/ethnic group (white girls: Msmart = .26 vs. Mbaseline 
= .16; girls of color: Msmart = .43 vs. Mbaseline = .28). Similarly, SES did not significantly 
moderate the age × gender interaction in children’s interest toward the smart game, Wald χ² = 
0.69, p = .407. For example, girls tended to pick more boys for the smart game than for the 
baseline game, regardless of whether they came from high-SES (Msmart = .35 vs. Mbaseline = .18) 
or low-SES (Msmart = .27 vs. Mbaseline = .18) families. 
In summary, messages that emphasize the importance of innate talent to success gave rise 
to a bias favoring males in children’s behavior, as they tended to provide more opportunities to 
boys than to girls in these contexts. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that women 
may be the targets of bias in fields where success is thought to depend largely on being brilliant. 
Over time, then, girls may face stronger barriers than boys in their pursuit of prestigious, 
intellectually-demanding careers.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
The present work marks a significant advance in our scientific understanding of the 
developmental course of gender stereotypes about intelligence and their pernicious consequences 
for young children’s activity choices and evaluations. Our findings so far seem to suggest that 
these stereotypes might be passed on to children as early as the first year of school. In addition, 
these stereotypes begin to influence children’s attitudes and behaviors as soon as they are 
acquired. Specifically, they seem to undermine young girls’ interest in activities said to be for 
“smart kids” and bias children’s evaluations of others’ competence for such activities.  
Studies 1 and 2 are the first to examine the development of the stereotype that associates 
males more than females with intellectual brilliance. Although prior work has explored many 
aspects of gender development as well as of stereotyping in early childhood, this is the first 
investigation of the harmful “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype that, we hypothesize, discourages 
women from pursuing many prestigious fields and occupations. Further, Studies 3 and 4 are the 
first to examine the developmental course of boys’ and girls’ attitudes toward, and engagement 
with, activities that are said to require high levels of intellectual ability. Although prior work has 
examined children’s attitudes toward activities requiring particular domain-specific skills (e.g., 
mathematics; e.g., Wigfield & Eccles, 2000), no research so far has documented, as we do, a 
divergence in boys’ and girls’ attitudes toward the broader class of activities thought to require 
high levels of raw intellectual ability. Moreover, Studies 5 and 6 are the first to examine the 
effect of brilliance-focused messages on adults’ and children’ implicit bias in evaluating females’ 
competence. In addition, Study 6 provides a novel examination of the developmental course of 
children’s bias in evaluating boys’ and girls’ suitability for activities that place a strong emphasis 
on intelligence. Although prior work has examined many aspects that could influence children’s 
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evaluation and affiliation choices (e.g., ingroup favoritism), this research presents the first 
examination of the developmental roots of the bias against females in careers portrayed as 
requiring intellectual talent. Since these careers often hold the highest status and are most valued 
in our society, this research illuminate some of the developmental roots of the current gender-
based status inequities.  
Practical Implications. Given the potential effects of these stereotypes, it is important 
for researchers, parents, and teachers to be aware of their developmental timeline so that we as a 
society can consider how we might best minimize their impact. To speculate, it is possible that 
neutralizing either of the components of the FAB model in young children would bring about 
gains in girls’ participation. First, conveying to children that men and women do not differ in 
their intellectual potential would make it less likely for brilliance-oriented messages to 
differentially threaten girls. Such an intervention would in fact be consistent with the current 
literature on this topic, which suggests gender parity in intellectual ability (e.g., Flynn, 2012; 
Hyde & Mertz, 2009; Spelke, 2005; for a different view, see Baron-Cohen, 2002; Deary, Thorpe, 
Wilson,  Starr,  & Whalley, 2003; Hedges & Nowell, 1995). A second, complementary 
intervention strategy would be to alter the ability belief component—or, at least, the messages 
sent to young children about how to achieve success. In particular, highlighting the importance 
of sustained effort (vs. raw talent) might reduce the impact of the “brilliance ≠ females” 
stereotype on girls’ motivation and the bias against their competence. In an effort-focused 
environment, women and girls who are targets of stereotypes against their intelligence might 
nevertheless believe they are capable of succeeding and might thus maintain strong motivation 
for the careers they are pursuing. In addition, an environment that emphasizes effort and growth 
would be less likely to signal to women that they will be judged on the basis of existing 
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stereotypes about their abilities (e.g., Emerson & Murphy, 2015). In the absence of this 
situational threat, it may be easier for women to join and persist in a field. More generally, the 
idea that abilities can be cultivated (rather than being fixed) is likely to have beneficial long-term 
effects for both women’s and men’s ability to sustain involvement with a field despite the 
unavoidable challenges that arise along the way (e.g., Dweck, 1999, 2006). In this way, we may 
have a chance of alleviating the negative consequences of the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype 
and putting men and women on an equal playing field with regard to their access to various 
careers.  
Future directions. These studies inspire further questions, which we plan to investigate 
in future work. For example, what are the sources of the “brilliance ≠ females” stereotype? Why 
does the stereotype seem to emerge (given our pilot data) between the ages of 5 and 6? Is 
exposure to school environments perhaps implicated in the acquisition of this stereotype? Where 
do children get the idea that males are more intellectually gifted than females, especially since 
girls usually get better grades in school than boys do? In our present work, we found children’s 
perceptions of which gender performs better at school do not predict their beliefs about which 
gender is brilliant, but many other aspects of children’s experiences in school, such as teachers’ 
attitudes and biases (e.g., Beilock, Gunderson, Ramirez, & Levine, 2010; Robinson-Cimpian, 
Lubienski, Ganley, & Copur-Gencturk, 2014) may still be implicated in the development of this 
stereotype. 	
We can also ask whether race might moderate the content of these stereotyped beliefs. In 
the present work, we assessed children’s stereotypes about white children and adults. Would 
children’s stereotypes differ for targets that belong to other race/ethnicity groups (and perhaps 
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depending on children’s own race/ethnicity group as well)? It will be also important to test 
whether these findings extend beyond a middle-class, majority-white US cultural context.		
Conclusions. Overall, the six studies provide a comprehensive investigation of the 
developmental aspect of the Field-specific Ability Beliefs hypothesis. These findings, coupled 
with prior research (e.g., Bian et al., under review; Leslie, Cimpian, et al., 2015) suggest that this 
theoretical model has the potential to explain the complex, field-by-field pattern of women’s 
representation across the entire academic spectrum. They also suggest that consequential 
stereotyped beliefs take root early, and thus that early intervention is crucial if we are to equalize 
the opportunities available to young women and men. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
The screener questions used in Studies 1–2 
“Smart” Block  
- The child can always answer even the hardest questions from the teacher.  
- The child learns things really fast. 
- The child can solve really hard puzzles.  
- The child figures things out really quickly. 
- The child watches really funny cartoons. (R) 
- The child practices sports all the time. (R) 
Question: Is the child smart, not smart, or are you not sure? 
Scoring: Mean of 6 items (1 = “smart”; 0 = “not smart” or “not sure”) 
  
“Nice” Block 
- The child likes to help other people.  
- The child always shares their toys with other children.  
- The child tries to make other children feel better when they are sad.  
- The child likes to give hugs to family and friends.  
- The child likes to listen to music. (R) 
- The child plays on the swings. (R) 
Question: Is the child nice, not nice, or are you not sure? 
Scoring: Mean of 6 items (1 = “nice”; 0 = “not nice” or “not sure”) 
  
Note. The items marked with an (R) were reverse-scored. Item order was randomized within 
each scale. Children who scored less than 0.67 on either block were excluded from analyses. 
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Table 2 
The Gender-Neutral Stories Used to Assess Children’s Stereotypes in Studies 1 and 2 
 Story about an Adult (Studies 1 and 2) Story about a Child (Study 2) 
Trait: 
Smart 
There are lots of people at the place where 
I work. But there is one person who is 
really special. This person is really, really 
smart. This person figures out how to do 
things quickly and comes up with answers 
much faster and better than anyone else. 
This person is really, really smart. 
When I was your age, there were lots of 
children at the kindergarten where I went. 
But there was one child who was really 
special. This child was really, really smart. 
This child learned things very quickly and 
could answer even the hardest questions 
from the teacher. This child was really, really 
smart. 
Trait: 
Nice 
There are lots of people at the place where 
I work. But there is one person who is 
really special. This person is really, really 
nice. This person likes to help others with 
their problems and is friendly to everyone 
at the office. This person is really, really 
nice. 
When I was your age, there were lots of 
children at the kindergarten where I went. 
But there was one child who was really 
special. This child was really, really nice. 
This child shared their toys with everyone 
else, and really cared about the other kids. 
This child was really, really nice. 
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Table 3 
Boys’ and Girls’ Stereotype Scores in Studies 1 and 2 (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Age Gender 
Study 1 Study 2 
Smart Nice Smart Nice 
5-year-olds Boys 0.71 (0.22) 0.66 (0.22) 0.73 (0.24) 0.63 (0.24) 
Girls 0.69 (0.19) 0.61 (0.31) 0.73 (0.23) 0.77 (0.23) 
6-year-olds Boys 0.65 (0.20) 0.40 (0.25) 0.69 (0.27) 0.49 (0.26) 
Girls 0.48 (0.24) 0.67 (0.15) 0.52 (0.21) 0.73 (0.15) 
7-year-olds Boys 0.68 (0.26) 0.43 (0.24) 0.66 (0.25) 0.48 (0.29) 
Girls 0.54 (0.21) 0.62 (0.18) 0.55 (0.23) 0.74 (0.17) 
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Table 4 
The number of children in each category in Studies 1 and 2  
 Boys Girls 
 5-yr-
olds 
6-yr-
olds 
7-yr-
olds 
5-yr- 
olds 
6-yr- 
olds 
7-yr- 
olds 
Favoring own gender 26 27 24 26 14 18 
Neutral 6 6 7 12 10 11 
Favoring other gender 8 7 9 2 16 11 
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Table 5 
The Games Used to Assess Children’s Interest in Studies 3 and 4 
 
Zarky 
I want to tell you about this game that I ask children to 
play sometimes. It’s called Zarky, and it’s a lot of fun. In 
this game, what you have to do is to bring the red pieces 
from this side to this side, one piece at a time, without 
going in a straight line and without getting them stuck in 
between the blue pieces. Oh, and here is something else 
about the Zarky game, and this is important so make sure 
you’re paying attention. This game is not for everyone. 
It’s only for children who are really, really smart [who 
try really, really hard]. Only smart [hardworking] 
children can be good at this game. 
 
Impok 
I want to tell you about this game that I ask children to 
play sometimes. It’s called Impok, and it’s a lot of fun. 
In this game, what you have to do is to figure out how to 
get the big pyramids next to each other in the black 
squares and get the small pyramids next to each other in 
the white squares in only ten moves and without crossing 
the grey squares. Oh, and here is something else about 
the Impok game, and this is important, so make sure 
you’re paying attention. This game is not for everyone. 
It’s only for children who are really, really smart [who 
try really, really hard]. Only smart [hardworking] 
children can be good at this game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Note. In Study 3, each of the games was presented in the “smart” format to half of the 
children and in the “try-hard” format to the other half.  
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Table 6 
The Four Questions Used to Assess Children’s Interest in Studies 3 and 4 
 
1) Imagine I had the Zarky/Impok game right here, in front of you. Would you want to play 
the Zarky/Impok game, or would you not want to play it? 
[if “yes”] 
Would you sort of want to play it (= 3), or really want to play it (= 4)?  
[if “no”] 
Would you sort of not want to play it (= 2), or really not want to play it (= 1)?  
 
2) Do you like the Zarky/Impok game, or do you not like it? 
[if “yes”] 
Do you sort of like it (= 4), like it (= 5), or really like it (= 6)?  
[if “no”] 
Do you sort of not like it (= 3), not like it (= 2), or really not like it (= 1)?  
 
3) Imagine you are playing the Zarky/Impok game. Would playing Zarky/Impok make you 
feel happy or sad? 
[if “happy”] 
Would it make you feel sort of happy (= 4), happy (= 5), or really happy (= 6)?  
[if “sad”] 
Would it make you feel sort of sad (= 3), sad (= 2), or really sad (= 1)?  
 
4) If you had a chance to do something tomorrow, would you play the Zarky/Impok game (= 
1) or would you do something else (= 0)?  
Note. The numerical scoring of each option is indicated in parentheses. Question order was 
randomized across children. Because the questions used different scales, responses to each were 
standardized before averaging.  
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Table 7 
Boys’ and Girls’ Interest Scores in Studies 3 and 4 (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Age Gender 
Study 3 Study 4 
Smart Try-hard Smart 
5-year-olds Boys − − −0.08 (0.88) 
Girls − − 0.11 (0.84) 
6-year-olds Boys 0.20 (0.71) −0.09 (0.81) 0.17 (0.63) 
Girls −0.17 (0.77) 0.10 (0.49) −0.21 (0.73) 
7-year-olds Boys 0.15 (0.69) −0.03 (0.90) − 
Girls −0.21 (0.88) 0.04 (0.58) − 
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Table 8 
Job Descriptions Used in Study 5 
Brilliance condition 
       We are looking for applicants to fill two new positions in our workforce. These 
positions will involve a lot of responsibility and the opportunity to join one of our newest, 
and most exciting, departments. 
        Because of the work we do, we are looking for candidates who have a high IQ, 
superior reasoning skills, and a knack for big, bold ideas. That is, we’d like to hire someone 
whose intellectual abilities stand out from those of their peers. Our work environment 
values and emphasizes employees' natural intelligence, expecting everyone to push their 
inborn smarts to the limit. Therefore, we are especially interested in candidates who 
demonstrate an inherent aptitude for this position.  
 
Dedication condition 
         We are looking for applicants to fill two new positions in our workforce. These 
positions will involve a lot of responsibility and the opportunity to join one of our newest, 
and most exciting, departments. 
         Because of the work we do, we are looking for highly motivated candidates with an 
outstanding work ethic and a superior commitment to doing their work as well as possible. 
That is, we’d like to hire someone who has demonstrated significant and sustained 
dedication in their past positions. Our work environment values and emphasizes 
employees’ strivings and their consistent effort to achieve goals, expecting everyone to 
continuously improve their work performance. Therefore, we are especially interested in 
candidates who demonstrate continual passion for the job. 
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Table 9 
Items in the Stereotype Endorsement Measure Used in Study 5.  
- One is more likely to find a male with a genius-level IQ than a female with a genius-
level IQ.  
- Extreme intellectual brilliance is more common in men than in women. 
- On average, men tend to have higher intellectual capacities than women.  
- Even though it’s not true of everyone, males are generally born with greater raw 
intelligence than females.  
- The reason why there are few female philosophers is that women tend to think more 
practically. 
- Men and women have complementary cognitive skills: Men are better at 
understanding objects and mechanical systems, whereas women are better at 
understanding people and their emotions. 
- Even though it may not be politically correct to say it, males and females might be 
naturally suited for different kinds of intellectual activities.  
- Males’ and females’ biology has an effect on their cognitive abilities (even though 
the differences might be small). 
 
Scoring: Mean of 8 Likert-type scale items (1 = disagree strongly; 9 = agree strongly) 
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Table 10 
The Games Used to Assess Children’s Bias in Study 6 
 
Zorb 
I want to tell you about this game that I ask children to 
play sometimes. It’s called Zorb, and it’s a lot of fun. In 
this game, what you have to do is to figure out how to get 2 
small coins and 2 big coins in each green tube. But you 
also need to make sure to have all the big ones at the 
bottom and all the small ones at the top without using any 
of the pink tubes more than once. [Oh, and here is 
something else about the Zorb game, and this is important, 
so make sure you’re paying attention. This game is not for 
everyone. It’s only for children who are really really smart. 
Only smart children can be good at this game.] 
Tever 
I want to tell you about this game that I ask children to 
play sometimes. It’s called Tever, and it’s a lot of fun. In 
this game, what you have to do is to figure out how to put 
as many pencils and erasers as you can into these holes in 
just one minute. But you also need to have the pencils in a 
straight line and the erasers in a triangle shape without 
having the straight lines cross the triangles. [Oh, and here 
is something else about the Tever game, and this is 
important, so make sure you’re paying attention. This 
game is not for everyone. It’s only for children who are 
really really smart. Only smart children can be good at this 
game.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Both games were presented in the “smart” format to half of the children.  
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Table 11 
The Proportions of Children’s Choices of Boys as Teammates in Study 6 (Standard Deviations in 
Parentheses) 
Age Gender 
Study 6 
Smart Baseline 
5-year-olds Boys    0.61 (0.31)    0.60 (0.38) 
Girls    0.21 (0.21)    0.16 (0.20) 
6-year-olds Boys 0.75 (0.27) 0.74 (0.24) 
Girls 0.30 (0.20) 0.22 (0.25) 
7-year-olds Boys 0.68 (0.22) 0.79 (0.22) 
Girls 0.40 (0.23) 0.21 (0.18) 
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Fig. 1. Boys’ (blue) and girls’ (red) stereotype scores in Study 1 (A and B) and Study 
2 (C and D), by age group (5- vs. 6- vs. 7-year-olds). The error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
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Fig. 2. Boys’ (blue) and girls’ (red) average proportions of selecting children of the same gender 
as having top grades in Study 2, by age group (5- vs. 6- vs. 7-year-olds). The error bars represent 
± 1 SE. 
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Fig. 3. Boys’ (blue) and girls’ (red) interest (average of standardized responses to 4 
questions) in novel games in Study 3 (A) and Study 4 (B). The main independent 
variable (task in Study 3, age in Study 4) is bolded. The error bars represent ± 1 SE.  
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Fig. 4. The difference between boys and girls in their interest toward the smart vs. the try-hard 
game was mediated by their own-gender brilliance scores. Standardized coefficients are 
depicted. * p < .05, + p < .10 
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Fig. 5. Average proportions of nominating males as job candidates for the Brilliance 
(Orange) and Dedication (Green) job in Study 5. The error bars represent ± 1 SE.  
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Fig. 6. Average proportions of boys suggested as teammates in Study 6, by Brilliance (Orange) 
vs. Baseline (Green) condition and the gender of participants. The error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
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